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The People themselves must be involved 
in the formulation and adoption of their 
Constitution because … a Constitution 
imposed on the people by force cannot be 
the basis of a stable and peaceful 
Government of the People. 
Guidelines on Constitutional Issues, 1991, 
1. 
 
 
1. The Durable Path towards Democracy in Malawi  
Over the last three decades, new winds of democratic change have been blowing 
over African constitutionalism (Oloka-Onyango 2001; Manga Fombad 2007; 
Manga Fombad and Murray 2010). These winds have stimulated the transition of 
several states from authoritarian rule to a democratic regime, and therefore have 
favoured the adoption of new constitutions in many emerging African 
democracies.2 The details of this assumption need not detain us here: suffice it to 
say that transitions also concerned the former English colonies, in general, and the 
Anglophone Commonwealth countries of eastern and southern Africa (ESA 
states),3 in particular. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to assess the multifaceted features that 
democratisation has taken on throughout Anglophone Africa since the inception 
of this democratisation wave in the early 1990s. Nor will it focus on how African 
                                                             
1 While this chapter was discussed jointly by both authors, Sections 1, 2, and 6 were written by 
Matteo Nicolini and Sections 3, 4, and 5 by Martina Trettel. 
2 For more on these new winds of change, see Slinn 1991 and Ghai 1991; Richard 1997. For 
Francophone Africa, see Reyntjens 1991, 44; Gaynor 2010. For Anglophone Africa, see Hatchard 
et al. 2010, 22-3. For a critical assessment, see Green 1989, 47. Botswana was the only country 
that retained a democratic constitutional context in the aftermath of decolonisation: see Cook and 
Sarkin 2001.  
3 See Hatchard et al. 2010, 2-4, and 3 note 7, where Mozambique is omitted from the ESA states 
because it is ‘a Lusophone country with a radically different constitutional tradition’ (at 3 note 7). 
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countries underwent democratic transition: in-depth analyses have been already 
dedicated to this topic.4 
Instead, it will focus on the case of Malawi, an ESA state that experienced a 
remarkable constitution-making process. We contend that, when drafting their 
constitutions, ESA states, in general, and Malawi, in particular, blazed innovative 
trails to democracy, thus experiencing heterogeneous processes of constitutional 
transition. On the one hand, leaders and political movements that promoted 
democratic transition resorted to constituent assemblies and constitutional 
commissions. On the other hand, as they were ‘seeking the people’s views’ 
(Hitchard et al. 2010, 29), they adopted innovative constitution-making 
mechanisms. To this extent, constituent assemblies were complemented by 
mechanisms of both direct democracy and citizens’ participation, such as 
commissions of inquiry or constitutional commissions that toured the countries in 
question to hold public meetings.5 
The choice to involve the populace reveals a fallacy in the current Western 
narrative on Africa’s transition to democracy. Instead of merely mimicking the 
Western legal tradition (Banda 2009), African constitutionalism proved to be 
innovative and far-sighted. Indeed, although American and European scholars 
have been examining civic and public participation since the second half of the 
20th century (Kaufmann 1969; Auerbach 1972; Hart 1972), the most developed 
countries have been drawing on participatory mechanisms in constitution-making 
processes only since the first decade of the 21st century, as the cases of Iceland, 
Ireland, and, at the subnational level, Canada and Italy, show (Tushnet 2014, 19ff; 
Suteu 2015; Trettel 2015). 
This blazing of innovative trails towards constitutional democracy allows us to 
propose an alternative reading of African constitutionalism. Societal inclusion in 
                                                             
4 See Huntington 1991. Although scholars mainly focus on South Africa (Sachs 1991; Wing 2000; 
Asmal 2007), all ESA states – with the major exception of Zimbabwe – have experienced a 
transition to democracy, including Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia. See Hatchard 
et al. 2010, 22 and 28ff. This is apparent as regards Namibia: see Cottrell 1991 and the seminal 
judgment in S v Van Wyk 1992(1) SACR 147 (Nm. SC), at 172-173: ‘Throughout the preamble 
and […] the Namibian Constitution there is one golden and unbroken thread – an abiding 
‘revulsion’ of racism and apartheid […] I know of no other Constitution in the world which seeks 
to identify a legal ethos against apartheid with greater vigour and intensity.’ 
5 For a comprehensive overview, see Hitchard et al. 2010, 29ff. 
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constitution-making processes has proven to render durable the transition to 
democracy and therefore the new constitutional designs that have been developed: 
since the early 1990s, legacies of transition have continued to shape African 
constitutionalism. Such durability is apparent when we consider how ‘most of the 
post-1990 […] African constitutions attempt […] to place some limits and 
restrictions on the powers of governments to amend the constitution’ (Manga 
Fombad 2013, 383). Legacies of the democratic shift are still present, as the 
numerous new democratic constitutions, recently approved in Kenya (2010), 
Zimbabwe (2013), and Zambia (2016), demonstrate (Stacey 2010; Chizuda 2014). 
Finally, durability has also been embedded in democratic constitutions, and 
societal engagement now governs the implementation of these durable 
constitutions. 
This also holds true for Malawi, a small developing country in southern Africa, 
bordered by Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia (Patel et al. 2007, 2-4). On the 
one hand, public participation complemented the work of the 1994 constituent 
assembly; on the other hand, the 1995 Constitution explicitly refers to societal 
participation in decision-making processes, in general, and in the implementation 
of governmental activities, in particular. There are indeed several participatory 
mechanisms that allow civil society to engage in parliamentary activities, 
including ‘advocacy and direct lobbying, developing position papers […] civic 
education and networking’ (Hussein 2005, 88-90). In this respect, participation 
pervades the entire spectrum of constitutionally entrenched decision-making 
processes, and represents a strong critical voice that has proven to be a contrast to 
attempts, in the last two decades, to turn Malawi into an authoritarian democracy. 
 
 
2. Setting the Scene: The Colonial Legacy and Malawi’s Participatory Spirit 
In order to shed light on the role of public participation in both Malawi’s 
democratic transition and constitutional implementation, we will first provide a 
brief overview of the socio-economic, historical, and political scenario that 
characterises this southern African country.6 
                                                             
6 On Malawi’s constitutional development, see Kapindu 2014. 
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With about 15 million inhabitants, Malawi is one of the world’s poorest countries, 
and with more than half its population living in poverty, Malawi ‘has ranked 
consistently as one of world’s least developed countries and relies heavily on 
concessionary development aid’ and donations coming from foreign countries, 
especially the United States and the United Kingdom (Scholz 2008, 1). Thus, 
Malawi is a ‘small heavily donor-dependent nation […] subject to the preferences 
of donors’ (Anderson 2013, 1). 
This is apparent throughout Malawi’s constitutional history. On the one hand, 
Malawi tried to sever its relations with its former colonial rulers. As soon as it 
gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1964 (on the colonial period, 
see Rotberg 1965), it promptly relinquished the Westminster model. The Queen, 
who originally remained as head of state represented by a governor-general under 
the 1964 Constitution (see Section 28: Roberts 1964), was replaced in 1966 by an 
elected president. On the other hand, colonial legacies contributed to rendering 
Malawi a closed society, which indeed had its roots in the English Protectorate of 
Nyasaland (1891-1961)7 and in the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland in 1953.  
Third, this closed society was secured by the authoritarian dictatorship of Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda, which lasted more than 30 years (1961-1993) until 1994, i.e., 
when the country moved in the direction of multi-party democracy (Chirwa 2014, 
3). Indeed, from 1961 to 1993, Banda presided over Malawi’s one-party state, 
which was characterised by autocratic and oppressive rule. This, however, did not 
prevent the regime from adopting an authoritarian Constitution in 1966. 
According to Section 4 of the 1966 Constitution, the Malawi Congress Party 
(MCP) was the only legally acknowledged political movement in the country, and 
Section 9 declared Banda president for life (Kanyongolo 2012, 3; Mwiza 2016). 
Moreover, Section 2(1) codified unity, loyalty, obedience and discipline, and 
party slogans as the four cornerstones of the government and the nation 
(Chimimba 2012, 40) 
Fourth, donors also contributed to the preservation of Malawi’s closed society: 
because of Banda’s anti-communist politics, the regime benefited from strong 
                                                             
7 See Africa Order-in-Council 1889, followed by the British Central Africa Order-in-Council 1902 
(as amended in 1907 and 1912). See Chimimba 2012, 23 notes 19 and 26.   
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support among Western powers. As a consequence, ‘Malawi was the only African 
state which maintained full and cordial diplomatic relations with the apartheid 
government of South Africa’ (Patel et al. 2007, 7).  
The authoritarian regime lasted for about 30 years until the ‘winds of change 
began to blow across the globe, also engulfing the continent, and change became 
imminent’ in Southern Africa (Patel et al. 2007, 7). 
This means that Malawi’s closed society started opening up and experiencing 
democratic participation after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in the late 1980s. Again, international donors triggered the path 
towards an open society. Various domestic and international actors exerted 
pressure on the authoritarian regime in order to open up Malawi’s closed socio-
political context.8 Banda’s authoritarian government thus agreed to hold a national 
referendum in order to directly involve the population in the decision regarding 
what kind of political structure Malawi would adopt. 
This referendum may undoubtedly be considered the starting point for 
comprehensive reflection on societal participation in Malawi’s constitutional 
democratic rule. In fact, direct democracy represented the first stage of the whole 
constitution-making process, through which Malawi also devised its own 
constitutional conception of popular participation. Societal involvement must then 
‘take into account the concerns of the widest possible segment of the population, 
must be transparent in its work, and to make such consultations meaningful, must 
properly structure its methods of consultation’ (Hitchard et al. 2009, 34). 
This is what we call ‘participatory spirit’: not only does it still pervade Malawi’s 
Constitution, but it has also played a role in contrasting shifts towards 
authoritarianism. In fact, several constitutional amendments passed between 2000 
and 2004 were aimed at subverting Malawi’s constitutional democracy and 
therefore at satisfying ‘the personal short-term interests of those wielding 
                                                             
8 See Patel et al. 2007, 7-8, which provides examples of events and actors pushing for the 
democratic transition. Among them, we can mention the 1992 pastoral letter issued by eight 
Catholic bishops against the regime, worker demonstrations and riots, the return from exile of 
opposition and trade union leader Chakufwa Chihana, and the creation of new political groups. As 
for external pressure, in 1992 the World Bank Consultative Group ‘froze all aid to Malawi, citing 
the Banda government’s poor human rights record and widespread political repression’. See 
Meinhardt 2001, 223ff; Chikaya-Banda 2012, 9. 
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governmental powers’.9 Nonetheless, ‘[t]hese and similar moves prompted civil 
society to keep a close watch on the government, making it more a watchdog than 
a partner in the governance process’ (Patel et al. 2007, 20). 
When devising the evolution of public participation in Malawi, we thus cannot 
limit our study to the period of the constituent process. We also have to take into 
account how public participation has evolved in the last 20 years of democratic 
rule. First, the voices of citizens have been heard through many channels during 
the development of a democratic Malawi. Second, participation adopted both an 
institutional (i.e., top-down) approach, as well as a bottom-up perspective.10  
In this regard, with its 23 chapters and 214 sections, the Constitution covers every 
conceivable area of Malawi’s economic, political, and social life (Mutharika 1996, 
205), as well as public participation. On the one hand, Section 40(1)(c) explicitly 
states that every person must have the right ‘to participate in peaceful political 
activity intended to influence the composition and policies of the Government’. 
On the other hand, Section 146(2)(c) does the same with regard to local 
government, which has the responsibility for ‘the consolidation and promotion of 
local democratic institutions and democratic participation’.  
 
 
3. Popular Participation in the Constitution-Making Process (1994-1995)  
We have already referred to the external and domestic actors that promoted 
Malawi’s transition to democracy. In this respect, both international donors and a 
popular movement acted as variables pushing for the introduction of a new 
democratic design, and therefore led to seeking the people’s views through the 
means of direct democracy. Hence, a referendum was held in 1993, and voters 
were asked to choose whether they preferred Malawi to remain a one-party state 
or to become a multi-party democracy.  
                                                             
9 Patel et al. (2007, 19-20) highlight how these amendments included the repeal of the section on 
the Senate, the amendment to Section 65 dealing with floor-crossing by members of parliament, 
and the attempt to extend the presidential term of office. 
10 Both features usually complement analyses of Malawi’s evolution towards constitutional, 
participatory democracy. For an assessment of popular participation from an institutional 
perspective, see Chirwa 2014. On the bottom-up approach, see Chihana 2008.  
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Although ‘President Banda was confident that Malawians would vote to retain the 
status quo – a one party system with him as head of state’ (Chiyaka-Banda 2012, 
9; see also Mwiza 2013), the referendum demonstrated Malawi’s mature 
democratic and participatory spirit. The referendum saw a very high degree of 
voter participation, in African terms, with a 69 per cent turnout. About 67 per cent 
of all those who voted chose multi-party democracy, while 33 per cent were in 
favour of preserving a one-party system (Dzimbiri 1994). 
The constitution-making process started at the beginning of 1994, right after the 
referendum was held. The National Assembly eventually passed the provisional 
constitutional provision for the Republic of Malawi (Constitution), Act No. 20 of 
1994. However, the pivotal decision to transform Malawi into a plural-democratic 
system was complemented by a traditional constitution-making process, as the 
constitutional assembly acted without any proper and broad-based societal 
consultation.  
If popular participation in constitution-making is the legitimate legal source upon 
which a democratic state is built, in the Malawian experience, the lack of 
consultation diminished the democratic legitimacy of the Constitution.  
In this regard, the responsibility for drafting the new constitution was entrusted to 
a National Consultative Council (NCC), which was established by the National 
Consultative Council Act No. 20 of 1993 (Chimiba 2012, 47). However, ‘none of 
[its] members […] were such by virtue of any popular elections; they did not have 
any direct mandate from the people to determine even the most basic framework 
of the Constitution’ (Hara 2007).  
Furthermore, there was a ‘significant influence of the “international experts” in 
the drafting process […] of the Constitution’ and ‘[s]ome of the recommendations 
of the international experts seem to reflect the Western Donors’ views of the 
Constitution to be created’ (Hara 2007). In addition, the NCC delegated the 
constitution-making process to a team of five Malawian experts with a British 
lawyer acting as an advisor (Chikaya-Banda 2012, 9; Kanyongolo 2012, 7; Mwiza 
2013, 234).  
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It should also be noted that the NCC started drafting the constitutional text at a 
time when many other activities were taking place, especially the organisation of 
the first general and democratic elections after 30 years of authoritarian rule.  
The lack of democratic legitimacy, however, did not affect Malawi’s democratic 
spirit. In this regard, it should be noted that the 1994 Constitution was an interim 
constitution that was to enter into force only for a one-year provisional period. In 
fact, Section 212 of the 1994 Constitution provided for the review of the 
Constitution during its provisional application by foreseeing the three following 
activities: 
 
(a) national civic education and consultation, during which the Committee would 
be involved in matters of public awareness and consultation on the Constitution; 
(b) the holding of a national conference ‘fully representative of Malawian 
society’; and (c) the consideration of the constitutional proposals by the National 
Assembly (Chimiba 2012, 50).  
 
The National Assembly (Malawi’s legislative body) appointed an internal 
Parliamentary Constitutional Committee, which was entrusted with the 
examination of the interim Constitution in order to propose amendments that 
could make it a permanent constitutional text. The Committee was also charged 
with the organisation of a popular consultation (the so-called Constitutional 
Review Conference): via public participation, citizens and representatives of all 
segments of Malawian society were thus given an opportunity to propose 
constitutional amendments. The Committee conducted hearings in the 24 
administrative districts of Malawi, and every citizen could attend and make 
proposals. A national constitutional conference was then organised in February 
1995: it was attended by 274 delegates from political parties and civil society 
organisations and lasted five days (Hara 2007). 
Despite the efforts to involve the populace in the revision process, the Conference 
was considered inadequate: it was capable neither of exerting a real influence on 
the drafting of the permanent Constitution nor did it create a strong link with the 
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population.11 This is apparent if only we consider that, when Parliament voted on 
the final constitutional text, it disregarded the two recommendations explicitly 
framed during the Conference: one regarded ‘the suspension of a provision for a 
senate’, and the other ‘the repeal of the recall provision’ (Chikaya-Banda 2012, 
10).  
Even in the absence of tangible popular involvement in the process, the permanent 
Constitution became the Constitution of Malawi Act No. 7 of 1995, which was 
passed by the National Assembly on 11 May 1995 and assented to by the 
President on 17 May 1995.  
 
 
4. What Is the Best Form of Participation for Malawi’s Constitutional 
Democracy? From Elections to the Law Commission 
Even if popular involvement was relatively scarce throughout the constituent 
process, since 1993 Malawians have had the possibility to take part in 
parliamentary and presidential elections, and therefore to democratically express 
their will. 
It should be noted that the concept of participation takes different forms and often 
serves different functions according to both the constitutional context and the 
subject matter it applies to. When applied to mature democracies,12 citizen 
participation usually encompasses a decision-making process that goes beyond 
representative democracy. As the latter is currently undergoing a profound 
structural crisis, Western countries usually complement representative institutions 
with democratic participation, i.e., with mechanisms that enable citizens to be 
directly involved in policy-making processes (Ank 2009; Sintomer et al., 2012). 
However, it is indisputable that, in modern and contemporary constitutional 
history, the concept of participation has always been theoretically related to 
representative democracy, to which, in more recent times, it has added elements 
carved out from deliberative and direct democracy (Frankenberg 2012). The 
                                                             
11 Indeed, two years later, ‘few people reportedly had “any idea what a constitution is”’. See 
Brown 2008. See also Mwiza 2013, 236.  
12 Mature democracies encompass those legal systems in which constitutions are fully developed, 
operational, and guaranteed. See Dahl 1992.  
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representative character of the liberal democratic system thus influences the same 
degree of institutional innovation. This holds true as far as participatory and 
deliberative democracies are concerned. Under constitutional democracy, liberal 
democracy governs the relations between different kinds of democracy (Wampler 
2008, 70). Representative democracy is related to deliberative democracy, which 
presupposes a model in which deliberation, through argumentation and 
persuasion, gives way to the broadest consent possible in public decisions. 
Evidently, when applied to representative democracy, deliberation aims to 
establish qualified majorities, not only in constitutional legislation or reform but 
also in the basic laws of local autonomies (Nicolini 2015, 440). 
This also holds true when we apply the concept of participation to emerging 
democracies: indeed, the concept in question allows us to examine their 
institutional developments from a very broad constitutional perspective that 
includes direct, deliberative, and representative mechanisms of public 
participation.  
These theoretical reflections also match Malawi’s empirical experience, where 
political participation through free and equal elections has contributed to the 
development of the democratic features of the new institutional system. 
Furthermore, the interrelations between the concept of participation and 
representation are particularly apparent in Malawi: indeed, ‘[a]lternative 
definitions and forms of democracy were not discussed in Malawi, and a liberal 
democracy with the principle of separation of powers with adequate checks and 
balances among the three arms of government was thus the essence of the 
constitution making [process]’ (Patel et al. 2007, 9). Together with the popular 
commitment to democracy, the trust placed in the traditional democratic decision-
making process is empirically demonstrated by the extremely high turnout in the 
1994 and 1999 elections, which reached 80 per cent and 94 per cent, respectively 
(Wiseman 2014, 4). 
Electoral participation, which played and still plays a pivotal role in the 
development of Malawi’s constitutional democracy, is complemented by 
additional channels of popular involvement, which support a viable and durable 
democratic evolution of Malawi’s institutional context. 
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We refer to the activity of the Law Commission, as it is laid down in Section 135 
of the Constitution, which reviews Malawi’s laws in order to ensure that they 
comply with constitutional and international law. On the one hand, this 
independent body was conceived of as a means for guaranteeing the coherence of 
the legal system by amending and removing all pieces of legislation that were 
inconsistent with the democratic constitutional provisions.13 On the other hand, it 
has the power to review and make recommendations regarding any matter 
pertaining to the Constitution: to this extent, and pursuant to these powers, two 
public conferences were organised in 2006 and 2007.  
However, the Constitution does not establish a clear methodology for the 
functioning of the Law Commission: it was the same members of the Commission 
who ultimately outlined it. As stated by Chikaya-Banda, a former member of the 
Law Commission:  
 
The Law Commission receives submissions calling for changes in the law from 
individual and institutional sources both private and public […] Submissions are 
assigned to law reform officers. They then conduct research to identify potential 
problem areas with the topic. These are set out in an ‘issue paper’ which 
announces the inception and scope of the review (Chikaya-Banda, 2012, 11).  
 
In order to strengthen citizen participation, the Commission decided to establish 
special and provisional Law Committees, which were entrusted with reviewing 
legislation related to specific and technical topics. We can detect a strong 
participatory feature in the approach to the Committees, as their composition 
included representatives of different segments and the interests of civil society. 
Commissioners could indeed be professionals, such as judges and lawyers, 
traditional leaders, or members of associations and organisations (Chikaya-Banda 
2012, 11). 
Since its establishment in 1998, public stakeholders have engaged the Law 
Commission in order to undertake a comprehensive review of the Constitution. 
                                                             
13 For more information regarding the Law Commission and its composition, see 
http://www.sdnp.org.mw/lawcom/index.htm?http%3A//www.sdnp.org.mw/lawcom/personnel.htm 
(accessed 14 May 2016).  
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The Commission was persuaded that such a review had to rely on broad popular 
engagement, contrary to what happened in the process of the adoption of the 1995 
Constitution. Therefore, the Commission decided in 2004 to establish a 
nationwide, highly publicised consultation that would last one year and take place 
through specific focus groups, discussions with traditional authorities, and 
informal consultation panels (Chikaya-Banda 2012, 16).  
Finally, it should be observed that Malawi’s Constitution has been amended many 
times, thus showing its profound weakness and lack of internal guarantees. These 
changes have been of various kinds, from very narrow to very broad amendments. 
The most extensive changes occurred in 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2010 
(Wiseman 2014, 5).  
 
 
5. Spreading the Participatory Spirit in Malawi: Public Access to 
Policymaking and Local Government 
The participatory spirit enshrined in the Constitution pervades not only 
constitutional and law-making processes, it also shapes governmental action: (a) 
civil society organisations may be granted a permanent seat on the governing 
boards of state institutions or parastatal organisations; (b) the executive may allow 
non-governmental organisations to take part in the development of public policies; 
(c) the executive has embraced a participatory approach to budget-making 
procedures. During budget-making sessions, the Minister of Finance organises  
workshops and breakfast meetings on a merely consultative basis: civil society 
organisations, universities, and the private sector are thus involved in the 
budgetary process (Wiseman 2014, 9).14 
Furthermore, citizens participate in the design and implementation of state 
legislation and public policies at the local level. Pursuant to Sections 3 and 6(1)(b) 
of the Local Government Act 1998, local government must promote the 
participation of the people in decision-making processes and consolidate local 
democratic institutions and participation (See Patel et al. 2007, 61ff.). Indeed, a 
high degree of subnational and local decentralisation offers ‘many opportunities to 
                                                             
14 This approach to the budget-making process is akin to participatory budgeting. See Sintomer et 
al. 2012; Wampler 2012. For a broad comparative overview, see Dias 2012. 
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look for new ways of increasing citizen participation’ (Sommermann 2015). In 
Malawi, the decentralisation process has been very weak because of the absence 
of a clear political project regarding local entities and the failure to hold local 
elections that should have taken place the year after the general elections (1994).15 
Only in 1998 was the Government of Malawi able to pass a law on local 
government (the above-mentioned Local Government Act 1998) and to establish 
local entities and approve the National Decentralisation Policy (NDP). Thereafter, 
local elections were finally held in 2000, though with a very low turnout of only 
14 per cent.  
The pendulum swung back towards recentralisation in 2005. As local government 
mandates came to an end, assemblies were dissolved and eventually suspended. 
The details of the suspension of Malawi’s local government need not detain us 
here; suffice it to say that, while framing a new NDP, the executive identified in 
the lack of popular awareness and local participation one possible reason for this 
political failure (Chihana 2008, 61).  
However, budgetary and political issues regarding the further development of 
local government structures remained unresolved, and local elections were 
postponed until 2014, when the presidential, parliamentary, and local elections 
were all held simultaneously for the first time in the country’s history (Patel and 
Wahman 2015, 80). In order to support the development of a stronger local level 
of government, a pilot participatory experience was established in February 2006 
in three Malawian districts. This was implemented through the method of open 
space technology, a participatory approach invented by Harrison Owen in 1992 
(Owen 2008) that examines how civil society should contribute in the 
development of local districts. The experiment had a positive effect and showed 
that it would be possible to strengthen local government by opening up space for 
citizens to be directly involved in policymaking processes. This methodology in 
fact increases the legitimacy of representative institutions, which comply with 
their legislative and executive decisions (Chihana 2008, 61). 
 
 
                                                             
15 On local government, see Section 146(2) of the Constitution. 
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6. Does the Participatory Spirit Really Work? The Light and the Shadow of 
Malawi’s Democratic Constitutional Framework  
Unlike other African countries, Malawi resolved the political, ethnic, and 
religious conflicts that arose during its transition towards democracy through 
institutional solutions instead of resorting to violent armed conflicts. This was 
possible because the participatory spirit enshrined in the 1995 Constitution helped 
in developing Malawi’s democratic governmental framework.  
To this extent, the Constitution was aimed at promoting and safeguarding multi-
party democracy, separation of powers, as well as the civil, political, and social 
rights of all Malawians (Chikaya-Banda 2012, 6). However, it has been argued 
that, using Roscoe Pound’s legal taxonomies, Malawi’s Constitution has probably 
remained more ‘law in books’ rather than becoming ‘law in action’: the failure of 
the Constitution ‘to facilitate democracy and development is attributed mainly to 
dysfunctions in its interpretation, application and enforcement, and not to its 
fundamental premises’ (Kanyongolo 2012, 2).  
Whereas the fundamental principles and rules foreseen in the Constitution grant 
Malawi the basis for establishing a real multi-party democracy, as well as civic 
and political participation, the subsequent evolution of the political, economic, 
and social reality has led to a misuse of the constitutional rules, as the saga of the 
approval of several amendments and of the suspension of local government 
clearly demonstrates. 
From this, however, it does not follow that no lessons can be drawn from how 
Malawi articulated public participation. If we compare Malawi to many other 
African countries, we can positively evaluate the role played by the participatory 
spirit entrenched in the Constitution. As already mentioned, this spirit helped 
avoid violent conflicts during the transition to democracy. In addition, it ensured 
broad public participation in the constitution-making process and allowed the 
populace to take part in the implementation of the Constitution, in general, and in 
legislative and governmental policymaking processes and actions, in particular. In 
other words, ‘the [c]ountry has a popularly accepted constitution that enjoys 
broad-based legitimacy, established institutions for democratic governance and 
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adequate mechanisms and opportunities for the promotion of popular participation 
in politics’ (Wiseman 2014, 30).  
This is not to deny the frequent problems that affect the transition to democracy 
and the establishment of constitutional democracy in Malawi. The high levels of 
aid dependency and indebtedness, the conditional use of donors’ funds, the high 
degree of corruption in politics, the absence of strong guarantees ensuring the 
application of the Constitution, and the failure of the decentralisation process 
made it possible to challenge and progressively reduce the room left for popular 
participation.  
Thus, tensions and contradictions remain. On the one hand, there is the black-
letter Constitution with its provisions regarding democracy, civil and social rights, 
citizenship and participation; on the other hand, there are political and cultural 
legacies, such as the role of traditional chiefs, who have a strong impact on the 
implementation of constitutional provisions. Indeed, public participation must 
cope with the strong powers that are traditionally vested in the chiefs (Gaynor 
2010, 803; Chihana 2008, 59) without divorcing the principles of democracy and 
good governance from African customary traditions (Tambulasi and Kayuni 2005, 
158). 
As public participation exhibits a great deal of resilience, it will probably be 
capable of amalgamating the two different, albeit intertwined, features exhibited 
by Malawian societal engagement: the participatory one, which focuses on 
people’s involvement in decision-making processes, and the traditional one, 
which rests on tribal and communitarian networks. This objective, however, was 
already laid down in the Local Government Act 1998. Indeed, Section 5(1)(b) of 
the Act recognises ‘Traditional Authorities and Sub-Traditional Authorities […] 
as non-voting members ex-officio of local assemblies’; at the same time, section 3 
assigns to local assemblies the responsibility for consolidating and promoting 
local democratic institutions. 
Hence, the participatory spirit may conjugate both sides of Malawian societal 
context (that resting on engagement and that relying on traditional law). If it is the 
case, this will mean that the flaws between the black-letter constitution and the 
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living one have been overtaken and that the time for a strong constitutional 
democratic commitment in Malawi has come.  
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